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The American legal system provides for the regulation of land
development through two principal means: government exercise of
the police power for the health, safety, welfare and morals of the
public (largely at the local government level), and the use of private
covenants attached to the development of land by means of
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conditions, covenants and restrictions (CCR’s) as agreements
between private landowners. Both make use of so-called land
development conditions to provide for public facilities, the need for
which is generated by the relevant land development. This article
addresses the principal legal requirements for public land
development conditions imposed under the police power (nexus and
proportionality) and the principle legal requirements for the
enforcement of private restrictions on the use of land (notice and
privity between the property owner enforcing the restriction and the
property owner against whom the restriction is enforced). Common
private land development conditions include construction or
contributions to the cost and maintenance of streets, sidewalks and
parks. Fulfilling such land development conditions − providing such
facilities, whether public or private − substantially reduces the need
for local government to provide for them using increasingly scarce
tax revenues.

I.

PRIVATE LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS

Private land use controls, in the form of the ubiquitous
conditions, covenants and restrictions (CC&Rs), increasingly
control the form, if not the pace, of development. Attached for
decades to the plat of subdivision filed with local government
authorities for public subdivision approval,1 CC&Rs form the basis
for the land use controls – indeed governance – of nearly all common
interest communities, whose numbers grow exponentially with each
passing year.2 In many parts of the country, it is increasingly
difficult for prospective homeowners to find housing outside such
communities, severely limiting, if not destroying, the choice-oflocation option that underlies the freedom to privately enforce the
elements of such CC&Rs without public oversight. 3
The covenanted community in the United States raises various
concerns including exclusion, social fabric and the like. 4 At bottom,
it is a permutation and extension of the private covenant
relationship between landowners, designed to ensure or, more
commonly, guard against, certain uses of land that public land use
controls (in the form of zoning, land development and building
controls) fail to deal with. This results in a private contractual
relationship affecting land between a promisor (usually a buyer of
an interest in land) and a promissee (usually a seller of an interest
1. ROBERT H. FREILICH & MICHAEL M. SHULTZ, MODEL SUBDIVISION
REGULATIONS 1-6 (2d ed. 1995).
2. EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE
OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 11 (1994).
3. Andrea Boyack, Common Interest Community Covenants and the Freedom
of Contract Myth, 22 J. L. & POL’Y 767, 770-71 (2014).
4. EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1-3 (1997).
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in land). The so-called "real" covenant lasts and is enforceable
beyond the lives or ownership interests of the original parties to the
covenant, "running with the land" on both the burden and benefit
side, with the interests of the land as they are transferred by the
original parties to subsequent buyers, devisees, and other
transferees.5 Thus, for example, if A, the owner of a 2-acre parcel,
sells 1 acre to B conditioned upon B building only a single-family
residence not to exceed one story or 4 meters in height, colored only
some shade of white and only with a red-tile roof, then that is the
only use which B can make of that 1-acre parcel, unless prevented
from doing so by public laws which may restrict the use even
further. Moreover, anyone buying the 1-acre parcel so restricted is
bound by B's promise, and anyone purchasing A's remaining 1-acre
parcel may enforce it, even though neither of these parties so
promised each other.
A major user of such real covenants is the property developer
of large residential communities who wishes to guarantee a certain
measure of uniformity, or difference, in the houses that make up the
projected community. The land developer will attach a list of
covenants dealing with homeowner assessments, design controls,
and use and upkeep of common areas such as private roads, parks
and recreational facilities both to whatever plan or plat of
subdivision local government authorities require to be filed as a
condition of land development, as well as to the deed to each lot or
house sold. Some time following the selling of the last lot (or the
construction of the last home if the developer is building them) the
developer transfers the enforcement function to some sort of
association of homeowners, thus forming a “homeowner's
association,” a variety of what the American Law Institute (ALI)
calls a "common interest community" or CIC and others have called
a "common interest development" or CID. 6 The elected board of
directors of that common interest community then maintains
enforcement of the CC&Rs consistent with their terms and the
bylaws of the association.
This trend does not necessarily portray a regional consumer
preference, but represents a culmination of building in the Sunbelt
during the past few decades.7 Many of the communities built in this
region are "lifestyle communities," which include retirement
communities as well as golf and leisure communities. 8 While the
retirement communities generally have homeowners who are
closely involved in the internal politics and workings of the
homeowner associations, the leisure communities often hire
“outsiders” to take care of property management, security, and
5. GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS,
REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 4 (3d ed. 2016).
6. Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes §1.8 (Am. Law. Inst. 1998).
7. Id.
8. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 11.
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maintenance so that they do not have to be bothered and can enjoy
the facilities, - which is often part of the appeal of buying into the
community.9
In all areas experiencing an increase in residential
construction, CICs are increasing in number. 10 The second tier of
states with a large proportion of CICs includes Texas, Illinois, North
Carolina, New York, Massachusetts, Georgia, Washington and
Arizona.11 Sixty-nine million Americans, or more than twenty-one
percent of the country's population, live in approximately 342,000
CICs.12 Of all developments built during the last half of the 1990s,
one-third were gated and regulated by the equivalent of private
governments: homeowner associations. 13 As a form of common
interest community, CIC’s represent a type of residential
development that also includes condominiums,14 cooperatives,15 and
planned communities.16 They closely approximate in many ways,
small municipal governments as they maintain private streets and
parks, provide homeowner security, collect homeowner assessments
for the purpose of financing the aforesaid activities, and often by
means of walls and gates, keep all but homeowners and their invited
guests from the precincts of the community. 17 Once considered the
domain only of the most affluent,18 CICs today represent the main
staple of suburban and metropolitan residential development.19
The latter part of the twentieth century witnessed the growth
of covenanted communities in record numbers. 20 Of the sixty-nine
9. Id. at 59-60.
10. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 11.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 12.
13. Michael Halberg, Gated Communities: Do They Raise Residents’
Expectations and Increase Liability for Associations?, 4 J. CMMTY. ASS’N. L. 5-6
(2001).
14. See WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 14 (2d ed. 1988) (illustrating that
condominiums are a type of housing organized so that residents own their
respective units in fee simple and own common areas as tenants in common).
15. See PATRICK ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW
AND PRACTICE §9.01 (2001) (establishing the cooperative form of housing vests
title in a corporate structure, with each resident owning stock in the
corporation).
16. HYATT, supra note 14, at 6-14; see generally ROBERT FISHMAN,
BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA (1987) (tracing origin of
suburban housing trends).
17. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 122-49 (discussing the essential
privatization of local government).
18. See James L. Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of
Community Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1136 (1998).
19. Id. at 1138. (“In the largest United States metropolitan areas, a majority
of all new housing sold is now in common interest communities.”).
20. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 4-7. See also MCKENZIE, supra note
2, at 11 (chronicling growth of privatized residential housing); see also Facts
About Community Associations, CMTY. ASS’N. INST., www.caioc.org/marketfacts/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2019) (stating: “There are 231,000 community
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million people living in CICs, more than eleven million (in 2009) 21
of these Americans live in over twenty thousand gated
communities.22 Safety, status, lifestyle enhancement and the
preservation of property values are prime motivators for buying into
these specific communities.23 It is estimated that eight out of ten
new residential housing developments in urban centers are
“gated.”24 They are proliferating in suburban areas as well, across
all regions and price classes, from New York to California. 25 New
homes in more than forty percent of planned developments are
gated throughout the South, the West, and the Southeastern United
States.26

A. Covenanted Communities and the Phenomenon of
Privatization: Constitutional Implications and
Judicial Standards of Review
The phenomenon of "privatization" describes the "shift of
government functions from the public to the private sector. 27 In
many ways, covenanted communities and their governing
homeowners' associations function as “private governments.” 28 Still,
associations in the United States. In 1965, there were only 500. Approximately
50% of all new homes built in major metropolitan areas fall within community
associations.” It also notes that the Community Associations Institute, a
national amalgam of developers, homeowners’ association leaders, residents
and lawyers, takes as its self-declared aim the education and representation of
America’s residential homeowners’ associations and service providers); See
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75,
81 (1998) (explaining that “residential community associations . . . have been
greeted with resounding approval in new real estate developments”); Michael
A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1183 (1999)
(describing common interest communities as “perhaps the most significant form
of social reorganization of late twentieth-century America”).
21. Laura Wojcik, Gated Communities: The American Dream Behind Walls,
J. INT’L (Oct. 29, 2013) (noting that the original article was translated from
French to English by Alice Robert).
22. Douglas S. Bible & Chengho Hsieh, Gated Communities and Residential
Property Values, 69 APPRAISAL J. 140, 145 (2001) (stating: “It is estimated that
eight million Americans are now living in over 20,000 gated communities that
restrict access to residents and their guests.”); Lois M. Baron, The Great Gate
Debate, 21 BUILDER 92 (Mar. 1998) (chronicling the rise of gated communities
“everywhere.”).
23. Edward J. Blakely & Mary Gail Snyder, Forting Up: Gated Communities
in the United States, 15 J. ARCHITECTURAL & PLAN. RES. 61 (1998); Edward J.
Blakely & Mary Gail Snyder, Places to Hide, 19 DEMOGRAPHICS 22 (1997); Carol
Tucker, Gated Communities: The Barriers Go Up, 80 PUB. MGMT. 5, 22 (1998).
24. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 7.
25. Id. Baron, supra note 22, at 92-96.
26. BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 7.
27. George L. Priest, Introduction: The Aims of Privatization, 6 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 5 (1988).
28. McKenzie, supra note 2, at 122; see also Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing
the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property
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in order to wage a constitutional challenge against a covenanted
community for discrimination, exclusion or a violation of civil rights
and liberties, the community must be deemed a "state actor." Some
scholars have argued that, because such communities are virtual
governments, they should qualify as de facto state actors.29 In that
case, they would be required to satisfy the Constitution's Due
Process, Equal Protection and First and Fourth Amendment
guarantees.30
Although this contention has not been squarely litigated before
the United States Supreme Court, lower courts have, for the most
part, resisted applying constitutional safeguards to CICs and are
ambivalent, if not somewhat confused, on the question of whether
to characterize privately owned communities as the sort of state
actors that would be subject to certain constitutional
requirements.31 Overall, courts have yet to develop a cohesive
jurisprudential framework in the larger setting of resolving
conflicts between covenanted community members and
nonmembers over the use of space and resources, exclusionary
practices, and alleged deprivations of civil liberties.
A California appellate court, however, did set some guidelines
for its jurisdiction. In Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Ass’n,32 a
resident of a private community who had paid a premium price for
his lot sued the homeowners' association because it had approved a
non-conforming fence that would partially obstruct the resident's

Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828-29 (1999)
(suggesting legislation to allow public neighborhood developments to be recast
as private neighborhood associations); Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl,
Private Communities or Public Governments: The State Will Make the Call, 30
VAL. U. L. REV. 509, 511-16 (1996) (exploring propriety of state action
designation to homeowners’ associations); Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P.
Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of Community Associations; In Search of the
Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 589, 634-41 (1993) (describing
community association as quasi-government, with many of the powers and
duties of municipal government).
29. See Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the
Recognition of Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty
Years after Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY B. RTS. J. 461, 462 (1998)
(suggesting various theories as to why homeowners’ associations should be
viewed as state actors); see also David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as
State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105
YALE L.J. 761, 767-68 (1995).
30. See Kennedy, supra note 29, at 778-93.
31. See id. at 764 (stating: “The question of whether to treat residential
associations as state actors has been addressed by numerous state court
decisions, producing little consensus. The difficulty of reconciling community
with exclusion explains much of this ambivalence and confusion over how to
treat these entities.”); Siegel, supra note 29, at 466 (noting that although
common interest communities possess many of the powers associated with local
government, they are rarely recognized as “state actors”).
32. Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty. Ass’n, 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 645 (1983).
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view.33 Plaintiff contended that the association had violated the
CC&Rs, been negligent, and breached its fiduciary duty. 34 Plaintiff
requested an injunction to stop the construction of the violating
fence and damages.35 The Declaration of the Homeowners'
Association lists the association's duties and responsibilities and
contains an absolution clause which states that the association has
no affirmative duty to fulfill the CC&Rs. 36 The court held that the
absolution clause was irrelevant because the association holds a
position of power over the homeowners37 and the decision to allow a
non-conforming fence was an administrative decision equal to a
zoning variance.38 Therefore, the decision was reviewable “to protect
neighboring property interests from arbitrary actions by
homeowner associations.”39 The court also found that the
association owes a duty of good faith to each individual member (not
just to the group of homeowners as a whole) 40 because the
association owes a duty of good faith to anyone affected by its
decisions.41
The United States Supreme Court has long held in other
contexts that the Constitution's Fourth Amendment protections are
not triggered by private party searches. 42 Presumably, then, the
private security guards of covenanted communities are not subject
to the constitutional constraints that would be imposed upon public
police officers.43 Similarly, the First Amendment would not seem to
guarantee non-residents the right to speak on private community
property.44
Those who wish to maintain the rights of HOAs to self-govern
without the interference of the government argue on the basis of
33. Id. at 645-46.
34. Id. at 647.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 649-50.
37. Kite Hill Cmty. Ass’n, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 655.
38. Id. at 652.
39. Id. (quoting Topanga Ass’n for a Sci. Cmty. v. Cty. of L.A., 522 P.2d 12,
19 (Cal. 1973)).
40. Id. at 652-53.
41. Id. at 653.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (finding
that a Federal Express employee’s search of package did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because Federal Express is a private company); see also Debroux
v. Virginia, 528 S.E.2d 151, 154-55 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (reaffirming the rule that
private security officers are not state actors).
43. See John B. Owens, Westec Story: Gated Communities and the Fourth
Amendment, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1127, 1142-49 (1997) (proposing that the
Fourth Amendment should apply to private security forces).
44. In William G. Mulligan Found. v. Brooks, 711 A.2d. 961, 967 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1998) (illustrating that New Jersey Superior Court held that a
gated community does not have to afford a non-resident the opportunity to
speak within its borders); see Frank Askin, Free Speech, Private Space, and the
Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L. J. 947, 960-61 (1998) (arguing that First
Amendment protections should apply to gated communities).
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freedom to contract.45 People choose to buy homes in covenanted
communities and therefore they assent to all of the conditions of the
contract. This argument presents some problems not only in that
the availability of housing outside of covenanted communities is
becoming more and more limited but also because many buyers are
not afforded the opportunity to review all of an association’s bylaws
before the purchase of their home.46 Many homeowners’
associations will not disclose their full list of bylaws to non-members
or, if they will, the potential buyer has to request and schedule their
own meeting prior to closing on the house. 47 This presents potential
problems where buying the property becomes an adhesion to all of
the terms of the homeowner’s association and raises issues about
the actual notice provided to those buying into the community. 48
In response, one prominent academic has suggested that
common interest community residents should be afforded their own
privately drafted bill of rights. 49 Two states have adopted a
homeowners' bill of rights that imposes upon homeowners'
associations some of the same mandates (such as open-meeting
rules) that would apply to local governments. 50 Further, since
homeowners' associations function, at the very least, as quasigovernments, the argument has been advanced that they ought to
be subject to stricter judicial review.51 Courts continue to evolve
guideposts for judicial review of association conduct. 52 Borrowing
45. Boyack, supra note 3, at 782-87.
46. Mirah Riben, Buyer Beware! HOA’s Deny Your First Amendment Rights,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2016), www.huffpost.com/entry/buyer-bewarehoas-deny yo_b_11779814?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cu
Z29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAKjnMUT8rnLhO7uRTiVYViAr
CJC964BRGKmRrbUcEU4hrw5dTznISjw2kf16DMqg_6Fop3aAC4Xozb01ZYS
98iCVFll9PaovQ5hwb8XGPougdwdRwDH2gAmjMsaE242GXytTS66ujoPS1l_t
gp_9G_3wLpc9zjG62s_o-mQiMRdR.
47. Id.
48. See Boyack, supra note 3, at 770.
49. See Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential
Government Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 35052 (1992).
50. See Matthew Benjamin, Hi, Neighbor, Want to Get Together? Let’s Meet
in Court!, 129 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 56, 56-57 (Oct. 30, 2000).
51. See, e.g., David C. Drewes, Putting the “Community” Back in Common
Interest Communities: A Proposal for Participation-Enhancing Procedural
Review, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 314, 349-51 (2001) (proposing that the judiciary
encourage participatory common interest community governance by varying
standard of judicial review based upon presence or absence of participatory
procedures in association’s decision-making process); Todd Brower,
Communities Within the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism, and Other
Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
203, 262-72 (1992) (arguing for stricter standard of judicial review).
52. Paula A. Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review
and Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 663, 666-71 (2000) (detailing
standards of review adopted by courts to review common interest community
rules and governing board actions, and proposing a multi-factored
reasonableness test to honor resident expectations as well as best interests of
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from models of corporate governance, some apply a “business
judgment rule,” which imposes the duty to act in good faith within
the scope of granted authority.53 Most courts have cast association
obligations in terms of reasonableness, requiring that the given
restriction or action only be rationally related to some legitimate
association purpose, such as the protection and preservation of the
health and quiet enjoyment of its residents. 54 With varying degrees
of success, courts seek to balance concerns for stability and
predictability with the need to protect against association abuse of
power.
As associations grow in numbers and popularity, whether or
not covenanted communities are private actors providing a
traditionally public function, remains to be seen. If they are, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins55 may apply to private streets much as it did to a shopping
mall.56 Presently, private communities tend to hinder, rather than
foster, communication with and from those outside their
jurisdiction.57 For example, in Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden
Rain Foundation,58 the California appellate court found that a nonresident newspaper cannot be refused if another newspaper
company was allowed on the property. The private community
attempted to prevent promotional distribution of a newspaper only
because it was not the community's “in-house” paper.59 This case
followed that of Marsh v. Alabama,60 where the Supreme Court
upheld a Jehovah Witness's right to distribute leaflets in a company
town.
However, in William G. Mulligan Foundation v. Brooks,61 the
New Jersey Superior Court found that a covenanted community is
not required to allow a non-resident to speak on the property, as
long as that common property is only set aside for non-

collective).
53. See Hyatt & Stubblefield, supra note 28, at 694-704 (noting a discussion
of the leading cases to apply the business judgment rule to common interest
communities).
54. See, e.g., Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding challenged restriction as reasonable and
in good faith); Riss v. Angel, 934 P.2d 669, 684 (Wash. 1997) (striking down
association decision because it was unreasonable and it lacked sufficient factual
basis).
55. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-88.
56. Richard Damstra, Don't Fence Us Out: The Municipal Power to Ban
Gated Communities and the Federal Takings Clause, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 525,
541-42 (2001).
57. Id. at 542.
58. Laguna Publ’g Co. v. Golden Rain Found. of Laguna Hills, 182 Cal. Rptr.
813, 815 (Ct. App. 1982).
59. Id. at 815.
60. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502-10 (1946).
61. William G. Mulligan Found. v. Brooks, 711 A.2d 961, 961 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1998).
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discriminatory private use. The court came to this conclusion after
finding that a private community newspaper was not included in
the term "free press" in the U.S. Constitution and that advertising
was not necessarily protected speech.62 Instead, the court relied on
the New Jersey Constitution's protection of private property, and
held that
Without considering the reasonableness of the restrictions or
limitation defendants placed on plaintiff’s “advertisement,” we
conclude that the normal uses of the property, the absence of
invitation for public use, and the type of the speech involved here do
not compel us to limit defendants' rights as owners of private
property.63

States must develop their own methods of interpreting the
difference between public and private issues and how to preserve
individual rights as well as private contractual agreements. 64 State
legislatures have done little to help their respective courts in this
arena, and as a result, state courts are struggling to apply their
state constitutions to national traditions and constitutional
protections for free speech, private property rights, public access,
equal rights, and limited search and seizure. 65
Surveying the states of California, Washington, Ohio and New
Jersey alone, one scholar points out the divergent methods of
constitutional interpretation.66 In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center,67 California held that the private property rights of a
shopping mall were not immune from the state constitution. The
court went so far as to say, "As the interest of society justifies
restraints upon individual conduct, so also does it justify restraints
upon the use to which property may be devoted.” 68 On the other
hand, Washington courts have decided not to use the "public
function" test of Marsh v. Alabama,69 but instead have employed
that of Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,70 which held that shopping malls are
easily distinguishable from company towns. 71 Ohio's Supreme Court
has held that the state constitution's free speech preservations
could be no broader than those of the U.S. Constitution, thereby
holding that a shopping mall could expel someone collecting petition
signatures.72 New Jersey uses a more flexible approach, allowing
the state constitution to protect private persons demonstrating on
62. Id. at 964.
63. Id. at 967.
64. Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 28, at 549-50.
65. Id. at 550-51.
66. Id. at 542-49.
67. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 342 (Cal. 1979).
68. Id. at 345.
69. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.
70. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 552 (1972).
71. Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 28, at 545.
72. Id. at 547 (citing Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ohio
1994).
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private property.73 The New Jersey Supreme Court's three-part test
balances (1) the use and nature of the private property, (2) the
purpose and method of the individual's expression, and (3) the level
of apparent invitation to the public that the private property has
made.74 The court has found that private shopping malls must
permit free speech because shopping malls are so similar to public
property.75
A common form of security provided by homeowners'
associations is private guards and patrols. These private security
forces now outnumber public ones, and it has not been definitively
decided whether private guards are state actors and thus subject to
the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment protections against
unlawful search and seizures.76 Although the residents' act of
buying into a private community may have consented to the private
policing, guests and workers in the community have not so
consented.77
The main function of private security forces is the protection of
property, not the assistance of the public police force by
apprehending criminals.78 Even so, those same private security
forces advertise "as the solution to overburdened police
departments with extremely slow response times.” 79 Sometimes
overburdened police departments will request assistance or
collaboration from private agencies.80 Some worry that the blurring
of public and private law enforcement "may eviscerate the Fourth
Amendment.”81
In a recent survey of homeowners, researchers found that over
twenty-four percent of CIC residents had experienced “significant
personal issue or disagreement with their associations.” 82

B. Covenanted Communities and Land Use Controls
Homeowners’ association’s use of covenants has been compared
to local zoning.83 Both include limitations on housing designs,
densities, aesthetics and uses, (a source of considerable contention
in their supervision by homeowners' association boards,
73. Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 28, at 547.
74. Id. at 548.
75. Id. (citing Middle East v. JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J.
1994)).
76. Damstra, supra note 56, at 540-41.
77. Id. at 541.
78. Owens, supra note 43, at 1139-40.
79. Id. at 1140.
80. Id. at 1141.
81. Id. at 1142.
82. Gerald Korngold, Private Regimes in the Public Sphere, LINCOLN INS.
LAND POL’Y, www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/private-regimes-publicsphere (last accessed Aug. 14, 2019).
83. Nelson, supra note 28, at 835.
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particularly if still controlled by the project developer). Coupled
with unlimited "variance" power, unbridled review and enforcement
often leads to heated disputes pitting CICs against individual
homeowners or small groups of homeowners over the conformance,
or lack thereof, of a particular house design with those prevailing in
the community. One scholar suggests that private community
developers be allowed their own zoning powers, without any
overlapping with the local zoning authorities or any role from people
who will not be living in the community. 84 While zoning generally
works as a planning tool for municipalities,85 the purposes of a
private community often include separation from the general
municipality. Privatizing zoning would be yet another step for CICs
to take toward privatizing government functions.86
However, each community "zoning" itself results in
uncoordinated land use planning of the area. One result may well
be cumulative traffic impacts for all neighboring communities. 87 Air
quality, property values, environmental preservation, efficient
public services, and well-located schools are all better coordinated
by a more regional government responsible for the region's public
services.88

C. Private Affirmative Covenants
As with public land use controls and exactions discussed in
Part II, private covenants can be affirmative in nature, requiring
the landowner to do something rather than refrain from doing
something. A prime example is the payment of a special assessment
or an annual fee for the upkeep of common elements like parks,
playground tennis courts and golf clubs.89 The most common of
affirmative covenants, the requirement to pay fees, can be expressly
agreed to in the CC&Rs or can often be an amendment adopted by
a homeowner’s association.90 As long as the requirement is found to
be reasonable, covenants requiring fees and assessments are
frequently enforced by the courts. 91

84. Id.
85. Id. at 837.
86. Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common Interest Developments:
Reflections on a Policy Role for the Judiciary, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 402
(1998).
87. Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J.
1985, 2043 (2000).
88. Id.
89. Edward J. Blakely & Mary Gail Snyder, Forting Up: Gated Communities
in the United States, 15 J. ARCHITECTURAL & PLANNING RESEARCH 61, 68
(1998); Edward J. Blakely & Mary Gail Snyder, Places to Hide, 19
DEMOGRAPHICS 22, 23 (1997).
90. Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes §6.5 (Am. Law. Inst. 1998).
91. Id.
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Other common affirmative covenants require a landowner to
join a homeowner’s association (which can then levy other
requirements). A recent case in Georgia upheld such a covenant and
found that even land that was given as a charitable donation was
still burdened and the charity was required to become a member of
the association.92 Similarly, state courts in Arkansas93 and Texas94
have upheld requirements that homeowners pay membership fees
to a private golf club as well as a transfer fee to the original land
developer every time the property was sold. A Utah court has
upheld a covenant enforcing an oil company to pay a fee akin to a
royalty to surface owners as a covenant running with the land. 95 A
Maryland court upheld a covenant requiring payment of pro rata
costs for public streets and utilities. 96 A Kentucky court upheld a
covenant requiring that the exterior of dwelling units must be at
masonry construction.97 A court also upheld an amendment adopted
by the HOA to force every homeowner to purchase a membership at
a nearby swimming club, including those who had owned their
homes for years before this decision was made and who did not wish
to use the club.98 A Louisiana court upheld a requirement that
homeowners regularly cut their grass and otherwise maintain their
house lots, and the homeowner’s association was permitted to fine
or penalize the homeowners if they did not comply. In a commercial
setting, a New York court recently upheld a deed requirement for
one building owner to provide steam heat to several adjacent
buildings.99 An Ohio court even ruled that a covenant to place a
plaque with the architect’s name on the building was valid and
further held that a covenant to host children’s movies on Saturday
for no more than $1 for a double feature would be enforceable had
it not included a provision saying that it was only for as long as
feasible, which it no longer was. 100 While less common than
restrictive covenants, affirmative private covenants are prime
examples of ways that property owners can exercise control over
their neighbors’ properties and increase (or sometimes decrease)
both their own property value as well as the property value of those

92. Lend a Hand Charity, Inc. v. The Ford Plantation Club, Inc., 791 S.E.2d
180 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
93. Dye v. Diamente, 510 S.W.3d 759, 761 (Ark. 2017).
94. Twin Creek’s Golf Group, L.P. v. Sunset Ridge Owners Ass’n, 537 S.W.3d
535, 537 (Tex. App. 2017).
95. Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah
1989).
96. Gallager v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1028 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
97. Marshall v. Adams, 447 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
98. Amberfield Homeowners Ass’n. Inc, v. Young, 813 S.E.2d 618, 623-25
(Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
99. Condor Funding LLC v. 176 Broadway Owners Corp., 147 A.D.3d 409,
410 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
100. Capital City Cmty. Urban Redev. Corp. v. City of Columbus, No. 15AP943 WL 7494342 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
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around them.

II. PUBLIC LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS: IMPACT
FEES, EXACTIONS AND IN-LIEU FEES
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, via
the Takings Clause, ensures that private property shall not be
taken for public use unless just compensation is paid. 101 The
Takings Clause does not specify the precise type of governmental
action that qualifies as a taking, but the Supreme Court of the
United States has identified three types of actions that qualify. 102
These actions include physical invasions, over-regulation, and land
use development conditions like exactions.103 This section will focus
on the latter type of governmental action. 104 In Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, the Court held that land use exactions require
an “essential nexus” between the nature of the condition and a
public need generated by the proposed development. 105 The Court
again considered the constitutionality of land use exactions in
Dolan v. City of Tigard, adding an additional requirement that
there be “rough proportionality” between the exaction and the
harms caused by the regulated activity.106

A. Application Beyond Interests in Property
After the Court formulated the heightened scrutiny of the
Nollan/Dolan standard for exactions, courts have struggled with the
application. Does the standard apply to all types of exactions or only
to land based exactions? As noted above, the Court’s Nollan and
Dolan opinions did not have any reason to address this ancillary
question that might arise in other exaction cases. Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Management District directly answered that
question in the affirmative. 107
Preliminarily, the Court decided whether the government
must meet the Nollan essential nexus test and the Dolan rough
proportionality standard in cases in which the permit applicant

101. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102. Jai Keep-Barnes, Inclusionary Zoning as a Taking: A Critical Look at
Its Ability to Provide Affordable Housing, 49 URB. LAW. 67, 86 (2017).
103. Id.
104. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421
(1982) (illustrating physical invasions); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438
U.S. 104, 105 (1978) (illustrating over-regulation); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (illustrating land use exactions); see also Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 374 (1994) (illustrating land use exactions).
105. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
106. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
107. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 612 (2013).
[Note that Koontz Sr. died at some point and Koontz Jr. took over the litigation.]
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rejects the proposed exaction rather than accepting it. 108 In both
Nollan and Dolan, the government offered the applicant a deal, the
applicant accepted it, and then the applicant brought a takings
claim challenging the constitutionality of the exchange. In Koontz,
by contrast, the owner rejected the government’s offer. Initially, the
Court observed that Nollan and Dolan allows the government to
condition approval of a permit on a dedication of property to the
public so long as there is a nexus and rough proportionality between
the property that the government demands and the social costs of
the applicant’s proposal.109 The Court then clearly stated: “The
principles that undergird our decisions in Nollan and Dolan do not
change depending on whether the government approves a permit on
the condition that the applicant turn over property or denies a
permit because the applicant refuses to do so.” 110 Further observing
that it had often concluded the denials of governmental benefits
were impermissible under the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, the Court admonished:
A contrary rule would be especially untenable in this case because it
would enable the government to evade the limitations of Nollan and
Dolan simply by phrasing its demands for property as conditions
precedent to permit approval. . . .Our unconstitutional conditions
cases have long refused to attach significance to the distinction
between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent.111

The Court then addressed the most critical issue: whether the
Nollan and Dolan standards apply in settings in which the
government exacts money rather than an interest in real
property.112 In each of the two earlier cases, the government had
asked the applicant to dedicate an interest in real property in return
for receiving the desired permit.113 The St. Johns River Water
Management District, by contrast, suggested to Koontz that he
spend money, which would not have required him to give up any of
the sticks in his real property bundle.114
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Associate Justice Alito held:
(1) a government’s demand for money or land from a land use permit
applicant must satisfy the nexus and proportionality requirements
from the Court’s holding in Nollan and Dolan, even when it denies
the permit, and (2) the government’s demand for property from a
land use permit applicant must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan
requirements even if the demand is for money−like impact fees, inlieu fees, and other money exactions−rather than a dedication of an

108. Id.
109. Id. at 606.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 606-08.
112. Id.
113. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377.
114. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 611-12.
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interest in real property, like an easement.115 In concluding that
monetary exactions must satisfy the nexus and proportionality
requirements of Nollan and Dolan, the Court explained the
required direct link between the government’s demand and a
specific parcel of real property: the property interest is the
landowner’s parcel for which government development permission
is sought, not the character of the exaction as an interest in real
property, as many have urged and some lower courts have held. 116
In this case,
[T]he monetary obligation burdened the petitioner’s ownership of a
specific parcel of land. . . .The fulcrum this case turns on is the direct
link between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of real
property. Because of that direct link, this case implicates the central
concern of Nollan and Dolan: the risk that the government may use
its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue
governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough
proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the specific
property at issue, thereby diminishing without justification the value
of the property.117

The Court then addressed the main question which caused the
major split among lower state and federal courts: “We turn to the
Florida Supreme Court’s alternative holding that petitioner’s claim
fails because respondent asked him to spend money rather than
give up an easement on his land.”118 Noting that such an argument
would render it easy for land use permitting officials to evade the
Nollan/Dolan limitation by simply substituting an in-lieu fee for an
exaction of an interest in real property like an easement, the Court
held: “For that reason and those that follow, we reject respondent’s
argument and hold that so-called ‘monetary exactions’ must satisfy
the nexus and proportionality requirements of Nollan and
Dolan.”119 The property interest necessary for cases such as these is
not a required dedication of land itself but rather the effect of any
exaction on the owner’s subject parcel: “unlike Eastern Enterprises,
the monetary obligation burdened petitioner’s ownership of a
specific parcel of land. . . .The fulcrum this case turns on is the direct
link between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of
property.”120
While there has been much wringing of hands − particularly in
the environmental community − over the supposedly cataclysmic
change Koontz has caused in the law of exactions and
unconstitutional conditions, “Koontz did not change the law so much

115. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 595-97.
116. Id. at 615.
117. Id. at 613.
118. Id. at 611-12.
119. Id. at 612.
120. Id. at 613.
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as protect it against nonsensical loopholes.” 121 Indeed, “it is difficult
to imagine how the District’s proposed exactions did not go beyond
what is roughly proportional to the impacts caused by Koontz’s
proposal.”122 It is not judicial activism at its worst, but instead an
attempt to rein in the deeply flawed notion that government may
extract regulatory windfalls. The issues all boil down to one’s view
of property development: a right of use of private land subject to
government regulation under the police power, or a privilege
conferred by government. The key is that government has at least
as much a duty to protect private property rights − a constitutional
obligation − as to protect the environment. Government is not
supposed to promote development under the police power, but
rather, permit it unless the health, safety and welfare of the people
requires its reasonable regulation.
1. Post-Koontz
After Koontz, state and local governments will obviously be
required to consider both nexus and proportionality when placing
conditions on land development permits, whether or not such
conditions require the dedication of interests in land or exactions of
money. This is true whether the condition is precedent (agree to the
condition or no permit) or subsequent (here’s your permit, but only
on the following conditions).123 This is the portion of the holding
upon which the Court was unanimous. On this point, the Court
clearly got it right. How this will play out in practice is not yet
clear.124 Some commentators suggest either that state and local
governments will simply stop negotiating entirely on land use
permitting matters or will leave it to a landowner to offer
sweeteners like workforce housing, oversized water and sewer
pipes, and community recreational facilities to facilitate their
permitting and rezoning requests.125 The latter opinion would
121. Amy Brigham Boulris, Substance Prevails Over Form in Property
Rights Case, DAILY BUS. REV. (July 15, 2013), www.dailybusinessreview.com/
PubArticleDBR.jsp?id=1202610781240&slreturn=20131013170230.
122. Jesse Souki, No Permit for You! − How Denying a Permit Could be a
Taking, HAWAI‘I LAND USE L. & POL’Y BLOG (June 28, 2014),
www.hilanduselaw.com/2013/06/no-permit-for-you-how-denying-permit.html.
123. See James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Extending Regulatory Takings
Theory by Applying Constitutional Doctrine and Elevating Takings Precedents
to Justify Higher Standards of Review in Koontz, 22 WIDENER L. REV. 33, 50
(2016).
124. See, Sean F. Nolon, Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz: How the
Supreme Court Invaded Local Government, 67 FLA. L. REV. 171, 211-19 (2015)
(explaining why Koontz makes land use negotiations less efficient and exploring
the consequences of Koontz on future land use negotiations).
125. See Michael M. Berger, Supreme Court Limits Land Development
Permit Conditions, MANATT (June 26, 2013), www.manatt.com/Insights/
Newsletters/Real-Estate-and-Land-Use/Supreme-Court-Limits-LandDevelopment-Permit-Condi; John D. Echeverria, A Legal Blow to Sustainable
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convert the land development permitting process into something
akin to Virginia’s infamous “proffer” system which virtually
requires such offers.126 However, others predict that the
consequences of Koontz will have little impact on negotiations
between state and local government and developers.127
2. Mitigation Fees
As the facts in this case deal with a mitigation fee and the
Court specifically rejected the distinction between money and real
property interests in applying the Nollan/Dolan nexus and
proportionality standards, the decision almost certainly applies to
mitigation fees charged to ameliorate the environmental effects of a
proposed land development project. Proportionality in particular
will be important here. We can logically expect more use of such fees
in place of land parcel requirements because the former will be more
easily constitutionally-tailored to a development-driven need. Thus,
for example, when a landowner is converting two acres to dry land,
the fee should compensate for more than those two acres. 128
Requiring a fee for the creation of a multi-acre wetland park would
almost certainly be disproportionate.
3. In-Lieu Fees
The nexus and proportionality requirements of Nollan and
Dolan are now applicable to fees often charged by local government
in lieu of a dedication of a property interest per se. The Court
specifically singled out such in-lieu fees in its opinion.129 Thus, for
example, where local government charges a road-building fee as a
condition for approving a residential subdivision rather than
develop a dedication of roads generated by the subdivision, the fee
will have to be proportional to that generated need as well.
Development, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/
opinion/a-legal-blow-to-sustainable-development.html?-r=0; see also Christina
M. Martin, Nollan and Dolan and Koontz-Oh My! The Exactions Trilogy
Requires Developers to Cover the Full Social Costs of Their Projects, but No
More., 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 39, 41 (2014) (addressing some of the concerns
held by commentators in the legal community about the impact of the Koontz
decision).
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2297 (West 2013).
127. See Daniel P. Selmi, Negotiations in the Aftermath of Koontz, 75 MD. L.
REV. 743, 745 (2016) (arguing that the actual impact of the decision is likely to
be relatively small); Shelley Ross Saxer, To Bargain or not to Bargain? A
Response to Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz, 67 FLA. L. REV. 5, 8
(2015).
128. Jessica Owley, Late to the Game: Koontz and Whether You Can Have a
Takings Claim Without an Actual Takings, LAND USE PROF BLOG (July 1, 2013),
lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2013/07/late-to-the-game-koontz-andwhether-you-can-have-a-takings-claim-without-an-actual-takings.html.
129. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 612.
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4. Impact Fees
The decision by its terms also applies to impact fees imposed
by the government to pay for public facilities such as schools, public
parks, and wastewater treatment plants. There is no reasonable
distinction among in-lieu fees, mitigation fees, and impact fees. All
are fees charged by government as a condition for land development
approval (as distinguished from charges such as user fees and taxes,
discussed below). All are embraced by the Court’s term “monetary
exaction,” and thus all are now subject to the nexus and
proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.130
5. Other “Exactions” vs. Taxes and User Fees
The Koontz dissent makes much of the confusion between
impact fees, on the one hand, and property taxes and user fees, on
the other, that will become even more significant as a result of the
decision.131 However, as the Court’s majority rightly observes, the
two are fundamentally different and based on fundamentally
different legal theories.132 Land development conditions, such as
impact fees and other monetary exactions, find their authority and
roots in the government’s exercise of the police power. Property
taxes, however, are rooted in government authority to raise
revenue−the power to tax, which requires no demonstration of
nexus and proportionality to any activity by the taxpayer. User fees
are merely charges levied on users for services rendered by the
charging government, like building permit fees. Although the
decision could conceivably be interpreted as an attempt to apply
intermediate scrutiny to all public finance decisions, there has been
no such broader scrutiny in the twenty-seven states that already
use stricter, intermediate scrutiny for monetary exactions. The
dissent is probably better read as a concern that the distinction is
difficult to draw in practice and that confusion will reign about
whether taxes and fees are also subject to stricter scrutiny. On the
other hand, perhaps the dissent would like to subject all public
finance to stricter scrutiny and uses the Koontz dissent as a vehicle
for commencing just that.133
130. See Carl J. Circo, Land Use Impact Fees: Does Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Management District Echo an Arkansas Philosophy of Property Rights?,
2014 ARK. L. NOTES 1626, 11 (2014) (predicating that “for the time being Koontz
will deter state and local governments from experimenting with mitigation and
linkage fee programs that they might otherwise explore to help finance
solutions to some of the most important problems that real estate development,
especially urban growth, present today”).
131. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 615.
132. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
133. Jonathan M. Zasloff, Koontz and Exactions: Don’t Worry, Be Happy,
LEGAL PLANET (June 27, 2013), www.legal-planet.org/2013/06/27/koontz-and-
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B. Application to Legislative Exactions
While it is relatively well settled that the Nollan/Dolan
analysis applies to exactions levied by adjudicative governmental
agencies on an ad hoc basis, there is a split of authority on whether
to apply the tests to legislative determinations. 134 In his dissent to
the denial of certiorari, in Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of
Atlanta, Justice Thomas noted that “[t]he lower courts are in
conflict over whether Tigard’s test for property regulation should be
applied in cases where the alleged taking occurs through an act of
the legislature.”135
Recall that in Dolan, where the Court added a second
requirement (proportionality) to evaluating the constitutionality of
governmental exactions, it left unclear what distinction, if any,
exists between adjudicative and legislative exactions. 136 Chief
Justice Rehnquist distinguished the Dolan case from Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.: “[H]ere, by contrast, the city made an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a
building permit on an individual parcel.” 137 Another section of the
opinion implies that the Nollan/Dolan analysis applies only to
exactions arrived at by adjudicative decisions:
The sort of land use regulations discussed in the cases just cited,
however, differ in two relevant particulars from the present case.
First, they involved essentially legislative determinations classifying
entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative
decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on
an individual parcel.138

The Court did not conclusively settle the issue of whether legislative
exactions are subject to Nollan/Dolan analysis, but many courts
have ruled that the Dolan test does not apply to legislative
decisions.

exactions-dont-worry-be-happy/.
134. Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings
and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights have Changed
from Penn Central to Dolan, and what State and Federal Courts are Doing About
It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 572-73 (1999); David L. Callies & Glenn H. Sonoda,
Providing Infrastructure for Smart Growth: Land Development Conditions, 43
IDAHO L. REV. 351, 367 (2007); Christopher T. Goodin, Dolan v. City of Tigard
and the Distinction Between Administrative and Legislative Exactions “A
Distinction Without a Constitutional Difference”, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 148
(2005); Jane C. Needleman, Exactions: Exploring Exactly When Nollan and
Dolan Should Be Triggered, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1563, 1574 (2006).
135. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 203 (Ga.
1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117 (1995).
136. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
137. Id. at 391 n.8.
138. Id. at 385.
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For instance, in Home Builders Ass’n v. City of Scottsdale, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that “[b]ecause the Scottsdale case
involves a generally applicable legislative decision by the city, the
court of appeals thought Dolan did not apply. We agree, though the
question has not been settled by the Supreme Court.” 139 Following
Scottsdale, in American Furniture Warehouse Co. v. Town of
Gilbert,140 the Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the superior
court’s finding that Nollan/Dolan did not apply to a traffic signal
development fee which was a “generally applicable legislative act”
and thus “carries a presumption of validity.”
The Supreme Court of Georgia adopted similar reasoning in
rejecting a Dolan analysis of a legislatively enacted barrier and
landscaping zoning requirement.141 Likewise, in Dabbs v. Anne
Arundel County, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that areawide impact fees imposed by legislation applicable are not subject
to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny.142 In Krupp v. Breckenridge
Sanitation District, the Supreme Court of Colorado also held that
the Nollan/Dolan test did not apply, because the impact fee exacted
was based on legislation.143 In Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, the
Supreme Court of California noted that
It is not at all clear that the rationale (and the heightened standard
of scrutiny) of Nollan and Dolan applies to cases in which the exaction
takes the form of a generally applicable development fee or
assessment --cases in which the courts have deferred to legislative
and political processes to formulate “public programs adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”144

However, other jurisdictions have applied the Nollan/Dolan test in
the context of legislative exactions, both physical and monetary. In
Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, the Oregon Court of Appeals applied
the Dolan test to a city ordinance requiring the dedication of rightsof-way for street widening purposes. 145 The court reasoned that the
character of the restriction remains the type that is subject to the
analysis in Dolan.146 In drawing its distinction between the
legislative land use decisions that are entitled to a presumption of
139. Home Builders Ass’n v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz.
1997).
140. Am. Furniture Warehouse Co. v. Town of Gilbert, 425 P.3d 1099, 1106
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
141. Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc., 450 S.E.2d at 203; see also Shelley Ross
Saxer, When Local Government Misbehaves, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 105 (2016)
(arguing that “Koontz 's application should be limited to “the special context of
land-use exactions” during a permitting process rather than be extended to all
regulatory monetary obligations”).
142. Dabbs v. Anne Arundel Co., 182 A.3d 798, 812-13 (Md. 2018).
143. Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 698 (Colo. 2001).
144. Ehrlich v. City of Culver, 911 P.2d 429, 446 (Cal. 1996).
145. Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); see
also J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas County, 887 P.2d 360 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
146. Id. at 573.

768

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:747

validity and the exactions that are not, the Supreme Court noted
that what triggers the heightened scrutiny of exactions is the fact
that they are "not simply a limitation on the use" to which an owner
may put his or her property, but rather a requirement that the
owner deed portions of the property to the local government. 147
The Oregon Court of Appeals has subsequently applied
Nollan/Dolan to legislative exactions.148 In Dakota, Minnesota &
Eastern Railroad v. South Dakota, the United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota considered a state statute that
required railroad companies to dedicate an easement in order to
obtain development permits. 149 The court held that the legislative
nature of the exaction “does not mean that a regulatory taking
analysis is the wrong framework for this case.” 150 The Supreme
Court of Washington and the Illinois Court of Appeals have also
applied the Nollan/Dolan test to legislative exactions.151 See also
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, in which the Texas
supreme court suggested, without holding, that it also favors
applying the Nollan/Dolan test to legislatively-imposed exactions:
We think the Town’s argument, and the few courts that have accepted
it, make too much of the Supreme Court’s distinction in Dolan. By the
same token, we need not risk error in the opposite direction by
undertaking to describe here in the abstract whether the Dolan
standard should apply to all “legislative” exactions – whatever that
really means - imposed as a condition of development.152

Justice Thomas, in his aforementioned dissent to the Court’s
denial of certiorari in Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc., questioned the
legislative/adjudicative distinction in the context of exactions:
It is hardly surprising that some courts have applied Tigard’s rough
proportionality test even when considering a legislative enactment. It
is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type of
governmental entity responsible for the taking. A city council can
take property just as well as a planning commission can. Moreover,
the general applicability of the ordinance should not be relevant in a
takings analysis. . . .The distinction between sweeping legislative
takings and particularized administrative takings appears to be a
distinction without a constitutional difference.153

147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383).
149. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. v. S.D., 236 F. Supp.2d 989 (D.S.D. 2002), aff’d,
362 F.3d 512 (8th Cir. 2004).
150. Id. at 1026.
151. Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. Of Schaumberg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 380-90 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995) (applying Nollan/Dolan analysis to a legislative land dedication
requirement); Sparks v. Douglas Cty., 904 P.2d 738, 746 (Wash. 1995) (en banc)
(holding a road dedication requirement reviewable under Dolan).
152. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Ests. Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620,
641 (Tex. 2004).
153. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116,
1117-18 (1995); see also, Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, Cal., 136 S.
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Despite anticipation from practitioners and academics who
wanted to see whether the Court would extend Nollan and Dolan to
legislative enactments such as the one in California Building
Industry Association v. City of San Jose,154 the Court denied
certiorari. 155 However, in a concurring certiorari petition opinion,
Justice Thomas wrote:
I continue to doubt that the existence of a taking should turn on the
type of governmental entity responsible for the taking. Until we
decide this issue, property owners and local governments are left
uncertain about what legal standard governs legislative ordinances
and whether cities can legislatively impose exactions that would not
pass muster if done administratively. These factors present
compelling reasons for resolving this conflict at the earliest
practicable opportunity.156

The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether
legislative exactions should be analyzed under Dolan and the lower
courts remain in disagreement over the issue. 157

C. Application to Workforce/Affordable Housing
Exactions
Unless local government can demonstrate a clear rational and
proportional nexus between market price and the imposition of
below-market cost housing set-asides, it may not require them at
any stage in the land development process. What scant precedent
exists for imposing such exactions on residential developments does
so only when the local government requiring such exactions
provides a series of meaningful bonuses to help offset the cost of the
mandatory affordable housing set-asides. As to the imposition of
such costs on non-residential development, local government must
demonstrate that it generates a need for such housing, generally of
the work-force variety, and that the amount to be set aside is
proportionate to that need. As one commentator noted in the
commercial housing set-aside context:
A number of cities have adopted exaction programs that require
downtown office and commercial developers to provide housing for
lower-income groups or to a municipal fund for the construction of

Ct. 928, 929 (2016) (noting Justice Thomas recognizing the division over
whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies to alleged takings arising from a
legislatively imposed condition).
154. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, Cal., 351 P.3d 974, 1000
(Cal. 2015); W. Andrew Gowder, Jr., Recent Developments in Exactions and
Impact Fees: Do You Know the Way to San Jose?, 48 URB L. 627, 636 (2016).
155. Cal. Bldg. Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 928.
156. Id. at 928-29.
157. See Glen Hansen, Let's Be Reasonable: Why Neither Nollan/Dolan Nor
Penn Central Should Govern Generally-Applied Legislative Exactions After
Koontz, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 291 (2017).
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such housing. [Such] programs satisfy the nexus test only if the
municipality can show that downtown development contributes to the
housing problem the linkage exaction is intended to remedy.158

Mandatory affordable housing requirements or linkage fees in
lieu of housing raise two basic takings issues. The first issue is
whether such fees pass scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s
“essential nexus” test in Nollan.159 The second issue is how the
“rough proportionality” test in Dolan applies.160 Indeed, as another
treatise observes, “When the provision of lower-income housing is
not linked to housing subsidies, zoning incentives may be necessary
to absorb losses incurred by the developer on the lower-income units.
Density bonuses are a possibility, and the ordinance can also relax
sited development requirements.”161
Turning then, to the first constitutional issue, because linkage
fees are a form of exactions, they are subject to the “essential nexus”
takings test under Nollan.162 Under Nollan, “a permit condition that
serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to
issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to
issue the permit would not constitute a taking.” 163 In addition,
under Nollan, the government bears the burden of proving this
nexus.164 In the context of linkage fees in particular, one treatise
explains that linkage fees satisfy this test “only if the municipality
can show that downtown development contributes to the housing
problem the linkage exaction is intended to remedy.”165
For example, in Commercial Builders of Northern. California.
v. City of Sacramento,166 the Ninth Circuit held that an ordinance
which imposed a linkage “fee in connection with the issuance of
permits for nonresidential development of the type that will
generate jobs,” (in other words, a workforce affordable housing
requirement) was constitutional under Nollan.167 Plaintiffs
challenged the ordinance directly on Nollan grounds: lack of nexus
or connection between the development and the affordable housing
condition. First, the court addressed the holding of Nollan whereas
Nollan holds that where there is no evidence of a nexus between the
development and the problem that the exaction seeks to address,

158. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 9.23 (5th ed. 2003).
159. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
160. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
161. DANIEL R. MANDELKER & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE LAW,
§ 7.27 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2006) (emphasis added).
162. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. See Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v.
Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing Nolan and how it
applies to exaction ordinances).
163. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 (emphasis added).
164. Dolan, 512 U.S. 391 n.8 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836).
165. MANDELKER, supra note 158, at § 9.23.
166. Com. Builders of N. Cal., 941 F.2d at 872.
167. Id. at 875.
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the exaction cannot be upheld.168 The court then explained that “the
[o]rdinance was implemented only after a detailed study revealed a
substantial connection between development and the problem to be
addressed.”169
The court related at some length what the City of Sacramento
did to establish the “substantial connection between the
development and the problem” of affordable housing. First, it
commissioned a study of the need for low-income housing, the effect
of nonresidential development on the demand for such housing, and
the appropriateness of exacting fees in conjunction with such
developments to pay for housing. The study:
[E]stimat[ed] the percentage of new workers in the developments that
would qualify as low-income workers and would require housing. [The
study] also calculated fees for development. . . .Also as instructed,
however, in the interest of erring on the side of conservatism in
exacting the fees, it reduced its final calculations by about one-half.
Based upon this study, the City of Sacramento enacted the Housing
Trust Fund Ordinance . . . [which] includ[ed] the finding that
nonresidential development is “a major factor in attracting new
employees to the region” and that the influx of new employees
“create[s] a need for additional housing in the City.” Pursuant to these
findings, the Ordinance imposes a fee in connection with the issuance
of permits for nonresidential development of the type that will
generate jobs.170

Consequently, the court found “that the nexus between the fee
provision here at issue, designed to further the city’s legitimate
interest in housing, and the burdens caused by commercial
development is sufficient to pass constitutional muster.” 171
Even courts that decline to apply heightened scrutiny to
legislatively imposed fees nonetheless apply some form of Nollan’s
essential nexus test. For instance, in San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City &
County of San Fransisco.,172 although the California Supreme Court
reaffirmed that legislatively imposed, ministerial impact fees are
not subject to the tests in Nollan or Dolan, it nonetheless required
that there “be a ‘reasonable relationship’ between the fee and the
deleterious impacts for the mitigation of which the fee is
collected.”173
The second issue is, provided the regulation satisfies a nexus
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 873 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 875.
172. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 87 (Cal. 2002).
173. Id. at 102-03 (citations omitted); but see 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of
W. Hollywood, 3 Cal. App. 5th 621, 729 (2016), reh’g denied, (Dec. 21, 2016),
cert. denied. 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of W. Hollywood, Cal., 138 S. Ct. 377,
377 (2017) (developer could not argue an “absence of a reasonable relationship”
between the development project and the demand for affordable housing more
than 90 days after establishment of the fee schedule).
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requirement, what reasonable percentage of affordable or workforce
housing will meet the constitutional proportionality test under
Dolan v. Tigard or some similar proportionality requirement. As
one recent commentator noted: “An inclusionary zoning ordinance
deserves . . . judicial deference . . . provided that the program
addresses a lack of affordable housing at a level proportionate to
each development and it can be defended through sufficient planning
by each municipality.”174 Much is clearly dependent upon the
circumstances in each case, but as one treatise on land use has
observed, while “[s]et-aside percentages and development size
requirements vary across the country, most set-asides range from
ten to twenty percent.”175
The handfuls of cases upholding inclusionary housing
programs without nexus or proportionality are easily
distinguishable. Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City
of Sacramento is already discussed above where the Ninth Circuit
held that a City of Sacramento ordinance was constitutional under
Nollan. To reiterate:
We . . . agree with the City that Nollan does not stand for the
proposition that an exaction ordinance will be upheld only where it
can be shown that the development is directly responsible for the
social ill question. Rather, Nollan holds that where there is no
evidence of a nexus between the development and the problem that
the exaction seeks to address, the exaction cannot be upheld. Where,
as here, the Ordinance was implemented only after a detailed study
revealed a substantial connection between development and the
problem to be addressed, the Ordinance does not suffer from the
infirmities that the Supreme Court disapproved in Nollan.176

Recently, in California Building Industry Ass’n. v. City of San
Jose, the city of San Jose enacted a housing ordinance that compels
all developers of new residential development projects with twenty
or more units to reserve a minimum of fifteen percent of for-sale
units for low-income buyers.177 The California Supreme Court,
followed the Erlich decision and refused to apply a Nollan/Dolan
analysis, stating:
[W]hen a municipality enacts a broad inclusionary housing ordinance
to increase the amount of affordable housing in the community . . .
the validity of the ordinance does not depend upon a showing that the
restrictions are reasonably related to the impact of a particular

174. Brian R. Lerman, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning – The Answer to the
Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383, 398-99 (2006)
(emphasis added).
175. ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, CH. 3, §3.07[3]
(2007).
176. Com. Builders of N. Cal., 941 F.2d at 875; CAL. GOV. CODE § 6591565918 (1974) (amended 2018).
177. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n. v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 1006 (Cal.
2015).
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development. Rather, the restrictions must be reasonably related to
the broad general welfare purposes for which the ordinance was
enacted.178

In considering how drastically Koontz expanded Nollan and
Dolan, one commentator suggests that the California Supreme
Court may be inconsistent with the precedent set by the Court in
Koontz.179 It is also critically important to note that California has
a mandatory bonus statute which is triggered when a development
provides affordable housing.
As recently amended and effective on January 1, 2005, the
statute requires a 20% density bonus as soon as a developer reaches
a set-aside threshold where 5% of its units are affordable to very
low income households or 10% of its units are affordable to low
income households, and increases in density bonus increments of
2.5% for each additional increase of 1% of very low income units,
1.5% for each additional 1% in low income units, and 1% for
increases in moderate income units, up to a maximum density
bonus of 35% when a project provides either 11% very low income
units, 20% low income units, or 40% moderate income units.

D. The Need for Proportionality
The required need for proportionality has not changed much in
the courts since Dolan called for and set out a vague standard on
how to determine “rough proportionality” based on individual
determinations. Some courts have relied on statute-determined
proportions, while other courts have looked at any evidence showing
the reasoning for the exaction as determining proportionality.
Additionally, one court has created its own semi-mathematical
analysis to determine proportionality.
1. Statutorily Defined Proportionality
The statute in Kamaole Pointe Development LP v. County. of
Maui,180 provided that the exaction can be applied to “any
development not involving water supply or service” or the developer
can opt for a 30% in-lieu fee provided by Ordinance
178. Id. at 1000. See Stephen R. Miller, A Ruling on Inclusionary Zoning
with Impact Beyond California’s Borders, 45 No. 1 REAL EST. REV. J. ART 7
(2016) (discussing how the California Supreme Court’s ruling may have a
nation-wide impact).
179. See James D. O'Donnell, Affordable Housing Ordinances: Exactions or
Use Restrictions in the Post-Koontz Era? An Analysis of California Building
Industry Association v. City of San Jose, 48 URB. L. 899, 902-03, 921 (2016); But
see Kristoffer James S. Jacob, California Building Industry Association v. City
of San Jose: The Constitutional Price for Affordable Housing, 7 CAL. L. REV.
CIRCUIT 20, 24-28 (2016) (arguing that the court decided the case correctly).
180. Kamaole Pointe Dev. LP v. Cty. of Maui, 573 F. Supp.2d 1354, 1364 (D.
Haw. 2008).
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§ 2.96.040(B)(4)(a)). In Robson Ranch Quail Creek, LLC v. Pima
County,181 the statute requires that the exaction must “reasonably
relate to the burden imposed on the county by the particular
development.” The court concluded that there was reasonable doubt
based on a water management audit that the exacted fees have been
substantially more than necessary to offset development costs and
that the fees could exceed the impact that the development had
created.182 (FN with Id.) In Home Builders Ass’n of Tulare/Kings
Counties., Inc. v. City of Lemoore,183 the 5-acre standard dedication
requirement was set out in a statute and the city’s plan.
2. Fact Specific Proportionality Inquiry
Based on an expanded traffic study in Greenville Concerned
Citizens, Inc. v. Floyd County Plan Commission,184 an uncapped
quarter share of improvement costs for the road intersection was
proportional because the study showed that the development would
have a direct impact on road intersections. In Toll Bros., Inc. v.
Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington,185
developers are only required to pay a pro rata share which is
determined to be fair and equitable, ensuring that “other
landowners do not enjoy a free ride at the expense of another's toil.”
Christison v. Lewis and Clark County 186 exemplifies rough
proportionality shown by traffic analysis indicating increased traffic
on a poorly managed public road causing public safety concerns.
David Hill Development, LLC v. City of Forest Grove 187 makes
conclusory statements about proportionality without any other
supporting evidence does not meet the “rough proportionality” test.
In B.A.M. Development, L.L.C v. Salt Lake County,188 the court
set out its own interpretation on what the Supreme Court really
meant by “roughly proportional.” “[R]oughly proportional literally
means to be roughly related, not necessarily roughly equivalent,
which is the concept the Court seemed to be trying to describe.” To
determine the rough equivalency, the court stated that the impact

181. Robson Ranch Quail Creek, LLC v. Pima Cty., 161 P.3d 588, 593-94
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
182. Id.
183. Home Builders Ass’n of Tulare/Kings Ctys., Inc. v. City of Lemoore, 112
Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 20 (Ct. App. 2010).
184. Greenville Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Floyd Cty. Plan Comm'n, 914
N.E.2d 866, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
185. Toll Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cty. of Burlington,
944 A.2d 1, 4-5 (N.J. 2008).
186. Christison v. Lewis & Clark Cty. Comm., 2011 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 5,
10-12 (2011).
187. David Hill Dev., LLC v. City of Forest Grove, 688 F. Supp.2d 1193,
1210-11 (D. Or. 2010).
188. B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C v. Salt Lake Cty., 196 P.3d 601, 603-04 (Utah 2008).
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from the development and the exaction should both be reduced to
actual cost. “The impact of the development can be measured as the
cost to the municipality of assuaging the impact. Likewise, the
exaction can be measured as the value of the land to be dedicated
by the developer at the time of the exaction, along with any other
costs required by the exaction.” The court further explained that if
the two costs are “about the same,” then rough proportionality has
been shown. However, the court declined to determine the scale of
what is considered “about the same.”

E. Need for Fees to be Spent to Benefit the Development
There is general agreement that fees must not only be
proportional to the problem or infrastructure needs generated by a
development, but also to be spent or otherwise used for that
development as well. However, the precise benefit of the fees on the
development need not be determined at the time the fee is exacted.
In Home Builders Ass'n of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale,189
the Supreme Court of Arizona interpreted Arizona Revised Statutes
Section 9-463.05 on development fees to require “that when a
municipality, in its legislative discretion, decides that new
developments will require additional public services, it need only
develop such plans as will indicate a good faith intent to use
development fees to provide those services within a reasonable
time.”
Similarly, in Home Builders Ass'n of Central Arizona. v. City of
Mesa,190 the Court of Appeals determined that a comprehensive
study detailing the impact of new development on demand for
cultural facility was sufficient to impose a cultural facility
development fee. The developers argued that the new development
is in the east end of the city and existing cultural facilities are
located in the west end.191 They contended that the fee failed to
comply with the beneficial use requirement of Arizona Revised
Statutes Section 9-463.05(B)(1) because the city did not
demonstrate how the fee would benefit the development. 192 The
Court of Appeals, however, followed Scottsdale in finding that
“municipalities are entitled to deference concerning whether a
development fee will result in a ‘beneficial use.’193 If the
municipality can show that its plans, calculations and predictions
are not ‘clearly erroneous, arbitrary, and wholly unwarranted,’ we
will defer to its judgment and uphold an ordinance as satisfying the
189. Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993,
998 (Ariz. 1997).
190. Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Mesa, 243 P.3d 610, 618
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) reh’g denied, (Apr. 19, 2011).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 617.
193. Id.
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broad requirements of section 9-463.05.”194
In Collier County v. State,195 the Supreme Court of Florida
reaffirmed the specific-need/special-benefit standard. The court
interpreted an earlier196 decision to mean that the fee was invalid
because “it did not provide a unique benefit to those paying the
fee.”197 In Collier County, the court “expressly repudiated a
countywide standard for determining the constitutionality of impact
fees” in finding that the “the services to be funded by the fee are the
same general police-power services provided to all County
residents.”198
Following Collier, in Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond
Beach, L.P.,199 the Supreme Court of Florida applied the dual
rational nexus test and determined that Aberdeen, an age restricted
community, did not need to pay impact fees for additional schools
because “Aberdeen neither contributes to the need for additional
schools nor benefits from their construction. Accordingly, the
imposition of impact fees as applied to Aberdeen does not satisfy the
dual rational nexus test.”200
In Idaho Building Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene,201
Idaho Building Contractors Association contended that a city
ordinance imposing a development fee imposed at the time of the
building permit issuance and used for general capital improvements
was a revenue raising measure rather than a regulation. The
Supreme Court of Idaho determined that the impact fees were
“designed to generate revenues to be used for capital improvements
throughout the City by all residents, and not solely for the benefit
of those seeking the building permit” and held that the fee was a
tax.202
In Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota determined that a road unit connection charge to new
developers was a tax and not a fee.203 The court determined that the
charge was a revenue raising measure that benefitted the public as
a whole.204 The court explained, “In reaching this conclusion, we
find it significant that revenues collected from the road unit
connection charge are not earmarked in any way to fund projects

194. Id. (internal citations omitted).
195. Collier Cty. v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. 1999).
196. See St. Johns Cty. v. Ne. Florida Builders Ass'n, Inc., 583 So. 2d 635,
637 (Fla. 1991).
197. Collier Cty., 733 So. 2d at 1019.
198. Id.
199. Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 13435 (Fla. 2000).
200. Id. at 136.
201. Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 890 P.2d 326,
330 (Idaho 1995).
202. Id. at 330.
203. Country Joe Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 1997).
204. Id.

2019]

Land Conditions: An Overview

777

necessitated by new development, but instead fund all major street
construction, as well as repairs of existing streets.” 205
In Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v.
Beavercreek,206 the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted a dual rational
nexus test in finding constitutional an ordinance imposing impact
fees on new developers for roadway improvements. Under this dual
rational nexus test, based on Nolan, Dolan, and Hollywood, the
burden of proof falls on the city. 207 In demonstrating the
constitutionality of the ordinance, the city “must first demonstrate
that there is a reasonable relationship between the city's interest in
constructing new roadways and the increase in traffic generated by
new developments.”208 Second, “if a reasonable relationship exists,
it must then be demonstrated that there is a reasonable
relationship between the impact fee imposed by Beavercreek and
the benefits accruing to the developer from the construction of new
roadways.”209 The court explained that when evaluating the second
prong, the court should consider:
the actual costs of constructing new roadways, the formula used to
determine the fee, the fee paid by a particular developer, the city's
contribution, road improvements made directly by developers, the
length of time between the payment of the fee and new roadway
construction projects, whether the roadway projects are site-specific
to the new development, and any other criterion that bears on the
reasonableness of the fee.210

By contrast, in Dabbs v. Anne Arundel County, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz inapplicable
to the subject impact fee ordinance.211 The court explained that the
legislatively-imposed development impact fee is predetermined,
based on specific monetary schedule, and applies to any person
wishing to develop property in the district. 212 Thus, the court found
that the ordinance fell “within Dolan’s recognition that impact fees
imposed on a generally applicable basis are not subject to a rough
proportionality or nexus analysis.” 213
In J.K. Construction, Inc. v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer
Authority,214 the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a new
“sewer service” fee imposed on new or upgrading customers for the
purposes of paying for future improvements was a charge not a tax.
205. Id. at 686.
206. Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton v. Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 357
(Ohio 2000).
207. Id. at 356.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Dabbs v. Anne Arundel Cty., 182 A.3d 798, 800 (Md. 2018).
212. Id. at 811.
213. Id.
214. J.K. Const., Inc. v. W. Carolina Reg'l Sewer Auth., 519 S.E.2D 561, 564
(S.C. 1999).
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Among other factors cited for its decision, the court emphasized:
the required payment primarily benefits those who must pay it
because they receive a special benefit or service as a result of
improvements made with the proceeds. That special benefit is the
proper treatment and disposal of sewage. . . . [P]roceeds from the
required payments are dedicated solely to capital improvement
projects.215

Furthermore, “the proceeds are not placed in a general fund to be
spent on Authority's ongoing expenses and maintenance, which is a
hallmark of a tax.”216
In City of Olympia v. Drebick,217 the Supreme Court of
Washington held that that the state’s impact fee statutes did not
require the city of Olympia and other local governments to
“calculate an impact fee by making individualized assessments of
the new development's direct impact on each improvement planned
in a service area.” The court examined the legislative intent behind
the requirement that “the facilities funded by impact fees be
reasonably related and beneficial to the particular development
seeking approval.”218 The court concluded “the GMA impact fee
statutes permit local governments to base impact fees on area-wide
infrastructure improvements reasonably related and beneficial to
the particular development seeking approval. 219
Finally, in North Idaho Building Contractors Ass’n v. City of
Hayden,220 the Supreme Court of Idaho held that a capitalization
fee was an unconstitutional tax because it did not represent any
attempt to approximate actual use.221 The city of Hayden nearly
tripled the capitalization fee for new users on the local sewer system
to upgrade the sewer system and “extend the sewer system to the
entire area of city impact and provide sewer service to anticipated
new residents. . . .”222 While the court recognized that any excess of
money lawfully collected could be used to extend the sewage system,
it clarified that “[t]he power to spend money lawfully collected in
order to extend the system is not the power to base a fee on the cost
to extend the system to whatever size is desired.” 223

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 803 (Wash. 2006).
218. Id. at 806.
219. Id. at 811.
220. N. Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. City of Hayden, 343 P.3d 1086, 1087
(2015).
221. Id. at 1088-92.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1090.
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F. Creation of a Special Fund for Depositing the
Fees/No Transfer Between Funds
In the Homebuilders Ass'n of Tulare/Kings Counties, Inc. v.
City of Lemoore,224 the Homebuilders Association, in part,
questioned the City’s collection and administration of impact fees,
arguing “the City did not adequately identify the public facilities
and improvements to be financed as part of enacting the fee
resolutions.”225 The Court of Appeal determined that this argument
lacked merit as the City adequately identified the public facilities
and improvements when it enacted the development impact fees
and met the statutory requirement that the fees be deposited into a
separate capital facilities account to avoid commingling with the
local agency's other revenues and funds.” 226
In St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n,
Inc.,227 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld an ordinance imposing
an impact fee on new residential developments for new school
facilities finding that the ordinance “does not create an unlawful
delegation of power. The county determines the amount of the fees
and collects them. The money is placed in a separate trust fund. The
school board may only spend the funds for the new educational
facilities prescribed by the ordinance.”228
In Clare v. Town of Hudson,229 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire explained that “the legislature has established that
towns are not entitled to collect and expend impact fees for purposes
other than those for which they were collected.” 230 The court stated,
“Any impact fee shall be accounted for separately, shall be segregated
from the municipality's general fund, may be spent upon order of the
municipal governing body, [and] shall be exempt from all provisions
of RSA 32 relative to limitation and expenditure of town moneys.”
This provision makes clear that the impact fee funds and Town funds
are not fungible.231

The court determined that the Town’s transfer of $89,153.95 from
an account that contained development fees collected for
improvements to Bush Hill Road to Brox Industries for its pavement
work on the road was not authorized because only $75,437.05 was
224. Homebuilders Ass'n of Tulare/Kings Counties, Inc., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7,
25 (Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied, (Sept. 22, 2010).
225. Id. at 24.
226. Id. at 25. See also City of San Marcos v. Loma San Marcos, LLC, 234
Cal. App. 4th 1045, 1059 (2015), reh’g denied, (June 10, 2015) (holding that
current impact mitigation fee was not subject to offset for amounts paid by the
prior owners when property was permitted as a recycling center).
227. St. Johns Cty., 583 So. 2d at 642.
228. Id.
229. Clare v. Town of Hudson, 999 A.2d 348, 355 (N.H. 2010).
230. Id.
231. Id. (citing to RSA 674:21, V(c)).
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attributable to the purposes for which the fee was collected. 232

G. Fees Not Spent Within a Reasonable Time of
Collection Must be Refunded.
In St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n,
Inc.,233 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld an ordinance that
included a provision that says, “Any funds not expended within six
years, together with interest, will be returned to the current
landowner upon application.” In Anne Arundel County v. Halle
Development, Inc.,234 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the circuit
court order for the county to refund impact fees collected between
1988 and 1991 that were not expended. Anne Arundel County Code
section 17-11-210 provides that collected development fees must be
expended six years from the time of collection, after which time
eligible property owners may apply for a refund.235 The Court of
Appeals held that the current property owners had remedy in
assumpsit to a refund because the county failed to follow the
ordinances notice requirements and eligible property owners did not
receive notice of the refund.236
In Tommy Davis Construction, Inc. v. Cape Fear Public Utility
Authority,237 the Court of Appeals held that the collection of water
and sewer fees has been impermissible as beyond the county’s
authority where there was no plan to actually use the collected fees,
within a reasonable time.238 Likewise, in Quality Built Homes Inc.
v. Town of Carthage,239 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed and invalidated sewer and water impact fee ordinances
aimed at funding future expansion of sewer and water systems. 240
The court held that the state’s Public Enterprise Statute does not
authorize a locality to collect fees for future discretionary
spending.241 In Robes v. Town of Hartford,242 the Supreme Court of
Vermont upheld the trial court’s conclusion that the Plant Impact
232. Clare, 999 A.2d at 355.
233. St. Johns Cty., 583 So. 2d at 637.
234. Anne Arundel Cty. v. Halle Dev., Inc., 971 A.2d 214, 230 (Md. 2009).
235. Id. at 226.
236. Id. at 216.
237. Tommy Davis Const., Inc. v. Cape Fear Pub. Util. Auth., 807 F.3d 62,
64 (4th Cir. 2015).
238. Id. at 69.
239. Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage, 789 S.E.2d 454, 455
(N.C. 2016).
240. Id. at 459.
241. Id. See also Walker v. City of San Clemente, 239 Cal. App. 4th 1350,
1357 (2015) (noting the city's five-year report did not show that the city needed
the unexpended fees to achieve the purpose for which they were originally
imposed or that it had a plan on how to use the unexpended balance to achieve
that purpose; the city was required to sell the vacant lot it purchased and refund
the sale proceeds to the affected property owners).
242. Robes v. Town of Hartford, 636 A.2d 342, 349 (Vt. 1993).
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Fee for sewage was a valid ordinance. The trial court’s decision
upheld the ordinance, but ordered the town to amend it to require
“the refund of monies not expended within six years of collection.” 243
In Cresta Bella, LP v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.,244 the court of
appeal found “no reasonable relationship between the school impact
fee and the burden posed by the development activity” and ordered
a refund based on the portion of fees derived from the preexisting
square footage in the development project.245

243. Id. at 344.
244. Cresta Bella, LP v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 218 Cal. App. 4th 438,
442 (2013).
245. Id. at 454.
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